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KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
approval. Even if the immunity ever existed, as the New York court
reasoned in the Rozell case, "it is not necessarily the function of a
court to refuse to declare a rule of conduct until the economic and
social order of the day forces its declaration by the state."1 4 This is
sound reasoning in light of the history of our judicial system in which
the courts have seldom waited for legislative action on matters that
could be solved by the courts themselves. Courts are always subject
to legislative command, but they do not have to wait for it.
When the problem arises in those jurisdictions which have not
yet decided the question, it is probable that disposition favorable to
suit will be made as it has so far in every jurisdiction which has
considered it. Reason and justice point in this direction.15
Philip Taliaferro, III
TRUST ADMnI5TRATION-P ICiPAL AND INCOME-ALLOC&TION OF IN-
CoME FROM PROPER=S DisposED OF BY THE EXECUTOR TO T
INCOME BENEFcCLRY-Testatrix, leaving a probate estate of $480,000,
provided for payments of taxes, debts, legacies, and expenses out of
her "general estate" in items I-V of her will. In item VI she be-
queathed to a trustee "all the rest, residue and remainder" of her
estate in two equal trusts for the benefit of her niece and nephew.
During the administration period $3,500 was earned on properties
which were subsequently disposed of by the executor to cover debts,
taxes, legacies and other administrative costs. Unable to determine
whether this particular income should be allocated to the income
beneficiaries or added to corpus, the executor instituted an action for
declaration of rights to the specified income. The trial court found
for the income beneficiaries. Held: Affirmed. Absent a contrary
manifestation of intent, the income beneficiary of the residuary trust
is entitled to the whole income derived from the residuary estate,
14 Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, -, 22 N.E.2d 254, 257 (1939).
15 If the problem should arise in Kentucky, the Rozell doctrine should be
accepted. This would be a natural development in the favorable climate created
by Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953), which held that a wife could
sue her husband for damages for personal injuries. Before that case, Kentucky
was one of the great majority of courts which steadfastly followed the common-
law rule of husband-wife immunity. The remaining intra-family immunity parent-
child, has just recently been stricken down in Kentucky. Harlan Natl Bank, Adm'r
v. Gross, -S.W.2d-, (Ky. 1961), overruling Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d
276 (Ky. 1954). It is hoped that Kentucky will continue the liberalizing
trend in family-relationship cases by following the unanimous line of decisions
rejecting the creation of an immunity between unemancipated minors of the same
family.
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including income earned on properties disposed of by the executor
in payment of the legal charges against the estate. Whitman v.
Lincoln Bank & Trust Co., 340 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1960).
Proper allocation of probate income earned on properties sold
by an executor to meet the various charges against the estate is a
recurring, unsettled problem in the administration of trusts for suc-
cessive beneficiaries.1 According to generally accepted authority an
income beneficiary of a residuary trust is entitled to income from
the residue beginning at testator's death, because the testator is
presumed to have intended this result.2 The precise question here
is whether "residue" comprises the entire estate before being dimin-
ished by proper charges against it, or whether it is that which re-
mains after all claims against the gross estate have been paid.
The answer, unfortunately, is not found in the Uniform Prin-
cipal and Income Act.3 The act which governs the allocation of re-
ceipts and expenses between income and principal in trusts for
successive beneficiaries makes no mention of estates in administra-
tion. For this reason the act has been held (by at least one court)
not to apply to allocation problems arising in probate estates.
4
In some jurisdictions allocation is governed by statute,5 but in
the majority of states the solution to the problem has been left to
the courts. Three methods of allocation based on two diametrically
opposed definitions of "residue" are found in the cases and statutes.
The methods may be identified as (1) the Massachusetts Rule,
(2) the Old New York Rule, and (8) the English Rule. Because of
the similarity in theory of the latter two rules, many courts,6 includ-
'Abernathy, "Is It Income or Principal," 95 Trusts and Estates 412 (1956).
2 Grainger's Ex'rs & Trustees v. Pennebaker, 247 Ky. 824, 56 S.W.2d 1007
S19:32); Folsom v. Strain, 138 Neb. 497, 293 N.W. 357 (1940); Restatement
Second), Trusts § 234, comment g (1959). See generally 4 Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees § 811 (1948) and I Scott, Trusts § 234.3 (2d ed. 1956). Historically,
no income was received by the life beneficiary during administration unless
specifically bequeathed by the testator, because the residue was not ascertained
until settlement of the estate. Proctor v. American Security & Trust Co., 69 App.
D.C. 70, 98 F.2d 599 (1938); Tilghman v. Frazer, 199 Md. 620, 87 A.2d 811
(1952).
39B Uniform Laws Annot. 365 (1931); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 386.190-.340
(1960).
4 In re Freehely's Estate, 179 Ore. 250, 170 P.2d 757 (1946).
See Cal. Probate Code § 162.5 (1960 Supp.); Conn. Gen. Stat. (Rev. 1958)
§ 45-192; Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 30, § 163 (1954); Md. Ann. Code art. 93, § 391
(1957); N.Y. Personal Property Law § 17-b; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 320.753(D)
1950). In all of the above statutes the Massachusetts Rule was enacted-the
same as adopted by the court in the principal case.
'O American Security & Trust Co. v. Frost, 73 App. D.C. 75, 117 F.2d 283
(1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 707 (1941); Proctor v. American Security &
Trust Co., 69 App. D.C. 70, 98 F.2d 599 (1938); First Nat'l Bank v. Allen, 86
F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Ga. 1949); Folsom v. Strain, 138 Neb. 497, 293 N.W. 357
(Footnote continued on next page)
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ing the Kentucky Court of Appeals, 7 in approaching the problem
entirely from a theoretical viewpoint have grouped them under the
heading "general rule." Often under such an approach, the court
fails to perceive the practical differences resulting from each of the
three distinct methods of computing "residue."
The Massachusetts Rule gives all income earned by the probate
estate to the income beneficiary, including income from properties
used to pay debts, legacies, taxes and expenses." "Residue" is deter-
mined as of the testators death and, as defined by the Massachu-
setts court in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Smith,9 it "comprehends the
whole of the estate ... left by the testator subject to all deductions
required by operation of law or by direction of the testator."10 The
testator is presumed to have intended this result, since the income
beneficiary is generally the principal object of his bounty."
Under the Old New York Rule12 the income beneficiary receives
only the income derived from that part of the estate which is not
disposed of by the executor in settlement of the estate.' 3 The income
from property used in settlement is added to corpus.14 The rule is
predicated on a definition of "residue" more closely approximating
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(1940); American Nat'l Bank v. Embry, 181 Tenn. 392, 181 S.W.2d 356 (1944);
Rosenberger v. Rosenberger, 184 Va. 1024, 37 S.E.2d 55 (1946).
7 Whitman v. Lincoln Bank & Trust Co., 340 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1960).
8 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Smith, 266 Mass. 500, 165 N.E. 657 (1929). The
Massachusetts Rule is the most recent in origin. Although the issue was raised as
dictum in Treadwell v. Cordis, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 341 (1855), and again in
McDonough v. Montague, 259 Mass. 602, 157 N.E. 159 (1927), it did not be-
come holding until the Old Colony Trust Co. case, supra, where the court relied
on its earlier dicta as authority.
9266 Mass. 500, 165 N.E. 657 (1929).
10 Id. at -, 165 N.E. at 658. Again relying on McDonough v. Montague,
259 Mass. 602, 157 N.E. 159 (1927), the court found "nothing in the will which
indicates an intention to make a change from the accepted rule that a tenant
for life is entitled to the income from the time of testator's death." Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Smith, 266 Mass. 500, -, 165 N.E. 657, 658 (1929). Thus the
court considers the generally accepted rule as to income from residuary estates
to apply to income from properties disposed of in settlement unless a contrary
intention is expressed. See Whitman v. Lincoln Bank & Trust Co., 340 S.W.2d
608 (Ky. 1960).
"In re Schiffian's Estate, 86 Cal. App. 2d 638, 195 P.2d 484 (1948);
Grainger's Exrs & Trustees v. Pennebaker, 247 Ky. 324, 56 S.W.2d 1007 (1932);
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 210 N.C. 339, 186 S.E. 335 (1936). For
a listing of cases following the Massachusetts Rule, see Restatement (Second),
Trusts, Appendix § 234 (1959).
12 The rule was specifically repudiated by statute in favor of the Massa-
chusetts Rule. N.Y. Personal Prop. Law § 17-b.
'3 Matter of Benson, 96 N.Y. 499 (1884); Williamson v. Williamson 3 N.Y.
Ch. R. Ann. (6 Paige) 298 (1837). For a listing of cases see Restatement (Sec-
ond), Trusts, Appendix § 234 (1959).
14 See cases in Restatement (Second), Trusts, Appendix § 234 (1959).
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its common meaning.', The Connecticut court, a former proponent
of the rule,10 has stated the definition as follows:
The residue is that portion of an estate that remains after the pay-
ment of debts, legacies, and administration charges.... [It includes]
income and accretions of the estate which are... not otherwise dis-
posed of by the will.17
The testator, it is assumed, intended to provide as large an income
as possible during the beneficiary's tenure. By an all-inclusive defi-
nition of residue, a larger corpus is provided making available in-
creased income in subsequent years.
The English courts, under the leading case of A11husen v. Whittel,'8
follow still a third rule. While committed to the theory of the Old
New York Rule that the income beneficiary is only entitled to income
from properties comprising the clear net residuary estate, the com-
putation of "residue" is completely different. "Residue" is derived
by reducing the probate estate by a sum which, with interest thereon
at the rate earned by the entire estate, will be sufficient to satisfy
the various charges against the estate.' 9 This sum by which the
probate estate is reduced, referred to as the "deduction fund," is com-
puted by use of the standard capitalization formula, x = P (r + 1) t,
the same as used when an estate includes unproductive or wasting
15 Residue is defined in Black, Law Dictionary 1474 (4th ed. 1951), as "the
surplus of a testator's estate remaining after all the debts and particular legacies
have been discharged." In Ballentine, The Self-Pronouncing Law Dictionary 783
(2d stud. ed. 1949), conflicting definitions are found for "residuary" and "resi-
due." Residuary is defined to be "that which remains of a decedent s estate after
the specific legacies have been paid." Residue, on the other hand, is "all of that
portion of the estate of a testator of which no effectual disposition has been
made by his will, otherwise than by the residuary clause."
10 Connecticut. like New York, adopted the Massachusetts Rule by statute.
Conn. Gen. Stat. (Rev. 1958) § 45-192.
17Stanley v. Stanley, 108 Conn. 100, -, 142 Ad. 851, 855 (1928). This
definition approximates that formerly given by the Kentucky court. Harlan Nat'l
Bank v. Brown, 317 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1958); McLeod v. Andrews, 803 Ky.
46, 196 S.W.2d 473 (1946).
18 L.R. 4 Eq. 295 (1867).
01In re Oldham (1927) W.N. 113; In re Wills (1915) 1 Ch. 769; All-
husen v. Whittel, L.R. 4 Eq. 295 (1867). After the Alihusen rule was announced,
various modifications were made causing the English Rule to closely approxi-
mate the Old New York Rule. See In re McEuen (1918) 2 Ch. 704; Lambert v.
Lambert, L.R. 16 Eq. 320 (1873). But the rule was revived with additional vigor
in In re Wills, supra, which held that the true principle of Allhusen was to de-
prie the tenant for life of income derived from a fund equivalent to the present
worth of a sum sufficient to satisfy the liabilities of the estate. Although there
was little American authority for the rule, it was adopted by the American Law
Institute in the Restatement, Trusts § 284, comment g (1985). However, the
Second Restatement of Trusts adopted the Massachusetts Rule. Restatement (Sec-
ond), Trusts § 234, comment g (1959).
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assets.20 Instead of discounting the estate by the total sum of all
charges against the estate as under the Old New York Rule, it is
reduced only by the present worth of these various charges against
the estate.
21
The practical differences resulting under each of the three rules
are demonstrated by the following illustration. Assume as in the
principal case a probate estate of $480,000, earnings at 4%/ and debts,
taxes, legacies and expenses totaling $87,500. Income from the entire
estate is $19,200 of which $3,500 is attributable to property sold by
the exebutor in payment of the $87,500.
Rule Allocation to income Corpus after Income at 4% available
beneficiary 1st year settlement in successive years
Massachusetts $19,200 $392,500 $15,700
Old New York 15,700 396,000 15,840
English 15,835 395,865 15,83522
The Massachusetts Rule is undoubtedly the most advantageous to
the income beneficiary. Although the additional income received dur-
ing administration necessarily results in a smaller trust income in
future years, by investing the additional income received during
administration the income beneficiary can secure an income in future
years equivalent to that which would be received under the Old
New York Rule.23 Under both the New York and English Rules the
income beneficiary shares part of the burden of administrative ex-
20 1 Scott, Trusts § 284.4 (2d ed. 1956). "x" is the total debts, legacies,
taxes, and other administrative expenses; "r" is the rate of earnings on the entire
estate; "P" is the deductible fund, and "t" is the period in years in which the
estate was administered. Since the deductible fund is the unknown, transposed
x
the formula becomes P -
(r + 1)t2
1'Tilghnan v. Frazer, 199 Md. 620, 87 A. 2d 811 (1952).
22 Udrthe Massachusetts Rule the entire $19,200 income is paid to the
income beneficiary the first year leaving the corpus at $392,500 ($480,000-
$87,500). Income from this sum at 4% is $15,700 which represents the antici-
pated income in each future year. Under the Old New York Rule, only the in-
come earned on properties not sold by the executor, $15,700 ($19,200-$3,500),
is awarded the income beneficiary. The $3,500 is added to corpus after the
deduction of the $87,500, leaving $396,000 which at 4% Til net $15,840 in87,500
future years. The computation under the English Rule is P -- . '1,
(1 + .04)1
the deductible fund, equals $84,185, and subtracted from the gross estate leaves
$395,865. Earnings at 4% in the first year and in future years will net an in-
come of $15,885.
23 Sir William Pendler illustrated this point in his commentaries following
a note in 80 Law Q. Rev. 481, 489 (1914). By investing the $3,500 at 4% in-
terest the income beneficiary would receive $140 annually. Added to her trust
return of $15,700 the beneficiary would then receive $15,840, the same as under
the Old New York Rule.
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penses preventing further depletion of corpus. The English Rule,
although somewhat more difficult to apply, results in what may be
referred to as a "refined apportionment." By computing residue as
of the testator's death, but not subject to reduction by charges
against the estate, the same amount of income is made available in
subsequent years as during administration.
24
Although courts of many states have cited Kentucky as com-
mitted to the "general rule' 25 under the holding in Grainger's E'rs
and Trustees v. Pennebaker,26 the Court of Appeals in the principal
case did not consider itself so bound. Limiting the Pennebaker case
to "the peculiarities of the will and testamentary trusts there in-
volved,"27 the court adopted the Massachusetts Rule in no uncer-
tain terms. Despite a number of cases in which "residue" was said
to be that portion of the estate which is left after discharging all legal
and testamentary claims, 28 a definition consistent with the "general
rule," the court redefined "residue" as "the entire estate undiminished
until the proper charges against it . . . are satisfied."2 9 Primary reli-
ance was placed on section 234, comment g of the Second Restate-
ment of Trusts as stating the prevailing law on the subject. Particular
attention was drawn to the Second Restatements reversal of the posi-
tion taken by the 1935 Restatement, indicating the modem trend in
favor of the Massachusetts Rule.
The Massachusetts Rule has prevailed, not because the average
testator would have intended this result, but because practical neces-
sity demands a rule that is simple to explain and easy to apply.30
Neither complex accounting procedures nor algebraic formulas are
required.31 Even though the income beneficiary receives what is re-
ferred to by some as a "windfall benefit during the administration
period" at the expense of the principal beneficiaries, the rule has
found the approval of executors, trustees and now the courts.
If the rule is not applied cautiously, the testators plan may be
24 Based on a misconception that all debts, taxes, legacies, etc., are paid
upon settlement date, the English Rule becomes quite complex in reality since
the formula must be applied for each payment. Note, 30 Law Q. Rev. 481 (1914).
25 Proctor v. American Security & Trust Co., 69 App. D.C. 70, 98 F.2d 599
(1938); Tilghman v. Frazer, 199 Md. 620, 87 A.2d 811 (1952); Rosenberger
v. Rosenberger, 184 Va. 1024, 37 S.E.2d 55 (1946).
20247 Ky. 324, 56 S.W.2d 1007 (1932). Both parties in the principal case
cited Pennebaker as authority for their view.2 7 Whitman v. Lincoln Bank & Trust Co., 340 S.W.2d 608, 610 (1960).28 Harlan Natl Bank v. Brown, 317 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1958); McLeod v.
Andrews 303 Ky. 46, 196 S.W.2d 473 (1946); Grainger's Exrs & Trustees v.
Pennebaker, 247 Ky. 324, 56 S.W.2d 1007 (1932).29 Whitman v. Lincoln Bank & Trust Co., 340 S.W.2d 608, 610 (1960).3o Abernathy, supra note 1.
31111 Scott, Trusts, § 234.4 (2d ed. 1956).
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destroyed.3 2 For example, if the testator left a heavily indebted estate
which, due to financial complexities, required an extended period of
administration, the interest and administration expenses borne solely
by principal could conceivably deplete the entire corpus. Meantime,
the income beneficiary would enjoy the full income from the prop-
erties which were subsequently sold to pay the indebtedness and
other charges against the estate. Thus an attempt to establish a resi-
duary trust for successive beneficiaries would be converted into a
specific bequest of probate income. In dealing with such a problem,
the court need only remember that the rule which it has adopted is
a rule of construction, not a rule of law. The court should not limit
itself to the four corners of the will as suggested in the principal case,
but the trustees, executors and court should consider the financial
circumstances surrounding the estate before making a conclusive de-
termination of the testator's intent. In some cases the court may find
an application under one of the other rules to be more consistent
with testator's intent.
The court in the Whitman case not only solves the allocation
problem by adopting the Massachusetts Rule, it vividly reminds the
practitioner and testator to specifically consider the subject of pro-
bate income in drafting the testator's will.
K. Sidney Neuman
WORKMN'S COMPENSATION-OccuPATIONAL DIsEASE-INJUmous Ex-
PosuRE-Claimant was employed as a mine motor car operator for
twenty-three months by the defendant from whom he sought com-
pensation for total permanent disability resulting from silicosis. Med-
ical testimony established that he had some degree of silicosis prior
to this employment, but that it had not reached the disabling stage.
There was evidence that in this employment claimant was exposed
for several hours a day to dust from sand used for wheel traction.
Some nine months after beginning work the claimant experienced
shortness of breath. Then over a year later a medical examination
revealed silicosis which had progressed to the disabling stage.
Claimant thereafter applied to the Workmen's Compensation Board
for an award of compensation. The referee's report recommending
such an award was set aside by the board, three members of the
five-member board sitting, one of the three dissenting. Compensation
was denied on the ground that claimant had not sufficiently proved
32 See examples in Tilghman v. Frazer, 199 Md. 620, 87 A.2d 811 (1952);
In re Freehely's Estate, 179 Ore. 250, 170 P.2d 757 (1946).
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